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Editor's Note : At 9:30 a.m. on Monday  we ex pect orders from the June 27  Conference, followed by  the opinions at 1 0:00 a.m. We will
begin liv e-blogging at this link at approx imately  9:1 5. The only  remaining undecided cases of the Term are Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby  and Harris v. Quinn.
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Symposium: Surprising unanimity, even more surprising clarity
Adam Gershowitz is a a Professor of Law at William and Mary Law School. He filed an amicus brief in support of Riley and Wurie.
This week the Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion in Riley v. California  and United States v. Wurie  that forbids law enforcement
officers from searching cell phones incident to arrest without a warrant.  The decision was ex actly  what many  commentators and Fourth
Amendment ex perts were hoping for.  Nev ertheless, it was still surprising on three fronts:  (1 ) the Court’s unanimity ; (2) its strong resistance
to splitting the baby  and adopting a compromise position that would hav e pleased law enforcement; and (3) the sweeping language and sheer
clarity  of the bright-line rule forbidding all warrantless cell phone searches incident to arrest.
First, although Justice Alito authored a short concurring opinion counseling that the Court proceed with caution, the decision in Riley  was
for all intents and purposes unanimous.  This was a surprise to almost all Fourth Amendment ex perts and Court watchers.  For ov er a
decade, Justice Scalia has taken the position that the search incident to arrest doctrine should be linked in part to whether it would be
reasonable to believ e ev idence of the crime of arrest could be found during a search.  Only  fiv e y ears ago – in Arizona v. Gant  — the Court
adopted Justice Scalia’s position for searches incident to arrest of automobiles.  The Gant  decision figured prominently  in the briefing of
Riley  and Wurie  and was discussed repeatedly  during oral argument.  Y et, neither Justice Scalia (nor Justices Thomas or Ginsburg, who
joined the opinion in Gant) wrote separately  to endorse the Gant  framework for cell phones.
This stands in stark contrast to the Court’s recent Fourth Amendment decisions about whether or not the gov ernment has conducted a
search. In the recent “Is it a search?” cases, Justices hav e written separately  to adv ocate for different standards.  For instance, last Term in
Florida v. Jardines, Justice Scalia wrote for the majority  that a dog sniff on the porch of a house was a search and pressed his v iew that the
standard should be whether there has been a phy sical trespass to property .  Justice Kagan agreed with the outcome, but concurred
separately  in Jardines  and continued to endorse the reasonable ex pectation of priv acy  test.  Similarly , in the 201 2 decision in United States
v. Jones,  Justice Sotomay or concurred and dropped the bombshell that “it may  be necessary  to reconsider the premise that an indiv idual
has no reasonable ex pectation of priv acy  in information v oluntarily  disclosed to third parties.”
In light of all the jockey ing for control of the underly ing methodology  of Fourth Amendment interpretation, the unanimity  in Riley  is rather
startling.  Perhaps the reason for broad agreement among the Justices is simply  that warrantless cell phone searches are so inv asiv e as to
merit their own rule.  A  better ex planation, howev er, might be that the case was argued in April – late in the Term – and that there simply
was not enough time for groups of Justices to coalesce around different, more nuanced approaches to the case.  (If the short timing is the
ex planation for the clear and unanimous opinion in Riley, that suggests the Court should shorten its Term ev en further and head home in
February  or March rather than June!)
The second surprise in the cellphone cases was the Court’s ability  to resist the temptation to split the baby .  The Riley  case inv olv ed a “smart
phone,” while the defendant in Wurie  was found with an older flip phone.  The Court could hav e crafted a rule allowing warrantless searches
of the older technology  (which is often used by  drug dealers to arrange narcotics purchases), while disallowing searches of smart phones that
hold more data.  The Court av oided the temptation to wade into the morass of which phones should get greater Fourth Amendment
protection.
More significantly , the Court refused to adopt the Gant  formulation in which police can search without a warrant if there is reason to believ e
ev idence of the crime of arrest would be found.  The Gant  compromise was alluring because it appeared to restrict police searches for low-
lev el crimes such as traffic  v iolations while still permitting officers to search the cellphones of drug dealers and other criminals who
frequently  use tex t messages to conduct unlawful activ ities.  The Gant  compromise was illusory , howev er, because in a digital age there is
reason to believ e ev idence of a huge number of low-lev el crimes could be found on a cell phone.  In addition to tex t messages and email
correspondence, cell phones hold incriminating photos; Facebook status updates about minor offenses; Google Wallet pay ments for alcohol
that could be linked to drunk driv ing; and, most importantly , location data.  Perhaps Chief Justice Roberts knew (or his law clerks or his
teenage children showed him) how clicking on his iPhone’s “Settings” icon, followed by  “Priv acy ,” then “Location Serv ices,” followed by
“Sy stem Serv ices” and then “Frequent Locations” would show the ex act addresses where he had been for the last six  weeks and how many
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hours and minutes he had spent at each place.  This location data would be a treasure trov e of ev idence for police with suspicions or
hunches about a particular suspect.  The Chief Justice thus went out of his way  to note that “a Gant  standard would prov e no practical limit
at all when it comes to cell phones” because “[t]he sources of potential pertinent information are v irtually  unlimited.”
Once again, it is hard to say  what motiv ated the Justices to reject the Gant  compromise position and instead offered such robust Fourth
Amendment protection for cell phones.  After all, the Court does not afford a fraction of the lev el of protection recognized in Riley  to other
Fourth Amendment areas such as Terry  frisks and automobile searches.  One answer might be that it is hard for the Justices to understand
the embarrassment that comes from being subjected to a Terry  frisk or an automobile search.  By  contrast, the Chief Justice identified a lot
of cell phone applications –  “apps for Democratic  Party  news and Republican Party  news; . . . apps for sharing pray er requests; . . . apps for
planning y our budget; apps for ev ery  conceiv able hobby  or pastime . . .” – that might be found on the Justices’ own phones and which they
might be embarrassed to rev eal to others.  The refusal to split the baby  in Riley  might simply  be attributable (subconsciously  or not) to the
Court’s desire to protect people like them, meaning the middle class or the elite.
Finally , the Riley  decision is surprising for how ironclad it appears to be.  The Court announced a flat prohibition of warrantless cell phone
searches incident to arrest and seemingly  left no wiggle room for future cases.  In quite blunt language, Chief Justice Roberts ex plained that
“[o]ur answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to arrest is accordingly  simple – get a
warrant.”  Although the Court frequently  claims to fav or bright-line rules in the criminal procedure area so as to giv e police adequate
guidance, the Court’s decisions and standards are rarely  as simple and blunt as this week’s decision in Riley.
For instance, last Term in Missouri v. McNeely, the Court rejected a categorical rule that would hav e allowed police to conduct warrantless
blood draws in drunk driv ing cases under the theory  that blood alcohol dissipates.  Instead, the Court offered the completely  unclear
guidance to police that “[w]hether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driv ing suspect is reasonable must be determined case by  case based
on the totality  of the circumstances.”  Concurring only  in part in McNeely, an ex asperated Chief Justice Roberts ex plained — quite correctly
— that “[a] police officer reading this Court’s opinion would hav e no idea—no idea—what the Fourth Amendment requires of him, once he
decides to obtain a blood sample from a drunk driv ing suspect who has refused a breathaly zer test.”  Y et, the Chief Justice’s own proposed
standard in McNeely – that ex igent circumstances ex ist if an officer could reasonably  conclude that there is not time to get a warrant –
hardly  seems like the hallmark of clarity .
When summarizing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence at 30,000 feet, criminal procedure professors often remark sarcastically  that the
Fourth Amendment requires police “to get a warrant, ex cept when they  can’t.” The clarity  and bright-line nature of the decision in Riley  is
therefore a breath of fresh air.
And unlike other Fourth Amendment decisions, it does not appear there will be much room for police to wiggle out of the rule in Riley.  For
instance, after Arizona v. Gant  scaled back police authority  to search v ehicles incident to arrest, commentators quickly  recognized that
police could conduct the same automobile searches by  couching their actions under the inv entory  ex ception, rather than the search incident
to arrest doctrine.  In Riley, the Court notes that police can still rely  on the ex igency  ex ception to search cell phones without a warrant.
 But, unlike the “search incident to arrest” ex ception or the inv entory  doctrine, the ex igency  rationale requires the police to demonstrate
probable cause for the search.  Of the hundreds of warrantless cell phone search decisions ov er the last decade, v ery  few could hav e been
justified under an ex igency  rationale.  The Riley  decision thus combines sweeping language with a clear bright-line rule that police will be
unable to wiggle out of by  turning to another ex ception to the warrant requirement.
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